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Abstract
The magnitude of the August 2003 blackout affecting the United States has put the challenges
of energy transmission and distribution into limelight. Despite all the interest and concerted
effort, the complexity and interconnectivity of the electric infrastructure have so far precluded us
from understanding why certain events happened. In this paper we study the power grid from a
network perspective and determine its ability to transfer power between generators and consumers
when certain nodes are disrupted. We find that the power grid is robust to most perturbations,
yet disturbances affecting key transmision substations greatly reduce its ability to function. We
emphasize that the global properties of the underlying network must be understood as they greatly
affect local behavior.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 02.10.Ox, 84.70.+p, 89.75.Hc, 89.75.Da
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During the past decades the North American power infrastructure has evolved into what
many experts consider the largest and most complex system of the technological age. Ge-
ographically, the power grid forms a network of over 1 million kilometers of high voltage
lines that are continuously regulated by sophisticated flow control equipment[1]. As a result
of the recent deregulation of power generation and transmission, about one-half of all do-
mestic generation is now sold over ever-increasing distances on the wholesale market before
it is delivered to customers[1]. Consequently the power grid is witnessing power flows in
unprecedented magnitudes and directions[2].
As the power grid increases in size and complexity, it is becoming more important to
understand the emergent behaviors that can take place in the system. Performing an analytic
description of the electromagnetic processes integrated over the whole grid is a daunting, if
not impossible, task. Instead the power industry must resort to constructing models that can
be used to simulate the network’s response to various external parameters. Generally these
models attempt to simulate actual electrical flow characteristics in smaller systems like a
single distribution grid[3]. In the present analysis we propose an alternative approach based
on recent advances in understanding the structure of large complex networks[4]. We choose
to investigate the network representation of the power grid from a topological perspective
with the hope of finding properties and behaviors that transcend the abstraction.
We have built the network model based on data stored in the POWERmap mapping
system developed by Platts[5], the energy information and market services unit of the
McGraw-Hill Companies. This mapping system contains information about every power
plant, major substation and 115 − 765 kV power line of the North American power grid.
Our model represents the power grid as a network of 14,099 nodes (substations) and 19,657
edges (transmission lines). We distinguish three types of substations: generators are the
sources for power, transmission substations transfer the power among high voltage trans-
mission lines, and distribution substations are at the outer edge of the transmission grid,
and the centers of local distribution grids. Only the identity of generating substations was
directly available from our data sources. We identify distribution substations by the criterion
of having a single high-voltage transmission line connected to them, with the expectation
that the flow out of them is continued on smaller voltage feeder lines leading to consumers[6].
A total of 1633 nodes are power plants, we classify 2179 nodes as distributing substations,
with the rest being labeled as transmission substations.
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We consider the power from a generator to be accessible to a consumer if there is a path
of transmission lines between the two. In practice, the existence of a connection between
two substations does not always imply that power can be transferred across it as there may
be capacity or other constrains present. By ignoring these our model provides an idealized
view, a best case scenario regarding the characteristics of the grid. We find that the network
representation of the power grid contains a single connected component, meaning that there
is a path of transmission lines between any power plant and any distribution substation.
This observation implies that in the best case scenario each distribution substation can
possibly receive power from any generator.
Recent advances in mapping the topology of complex networks have uncovered that a
large fraction of them are highly heterogeneous with respect to the number of edges incident
on a node (also called the node degree). In these networks the majority of the nodes have
low degrees, but there is a continuous hierarchy of high-degree nodes (hubs) that play an
important role in the system. The degree distribution of these networks follows a power-
law P (k) ∼ k−γ with the exponent γ mostly between 2 and 3. It was demonstrated both
numerically and analytically that these so-called scale-free networks are resilient to the
random loss of nodes, but are vulnerable to attacks targeting the high-degree hubs[7, 8, 9].
Therefore it is important both from a theoretical and practical standpoint to determine
whether the connectivity of the power grid is reliant on a small set of hubs and whether
their loss will cause a large-scale breakdown of the power grid’s transmission capability.
As the node degree is a good indicator of its topological importance, we first determine
the degree distribution of the power grid. We find that the cumulative degree distribution
defined as P (k > K) =
∑
k>K P (k) follows an exponential
P (k > K) ∼ exp(−0.5K) (1)
(see Fig. 1). This functional form agrees with previous results on the degree distribution of
the Western power grid[10] and its classification as a single-scale network. The cumulative
degree distribution shows that the probability of high-degree nodes is less than in a scale-
free network, but higher than in a random network with the same number of nodes and
edges. Power engineering principles suggest that the hubs of the power grid should belong
to central station generators, and transmission substations should not have more than a few
edges. Indeed, the inset to Fig. 1 shows that the fraction of generating substations among
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FIG. 1: The probability that a substation has more than K transmission lines. The straight line
represents the exponential function (1). Inset: the fraction Fg(k) of generating substations among
substations with degree k.
substations of a given degree increases with this degree. Surprisingly, however, there are
several high-degree transmission substations (e.g. 50 have degree higher than 10), including
the node with highest degree.
As the role of the power grid is to transport power from generators to consumers, a possi-
ble measure for the importance of a node corresponding to a substation is its betweenness (or
load)[11, 12]. The betweenness of a node in a network is defined as the number of shortest
paths that traverse it[11, 12]. Assuming that power is routed through the most direct path,
the betweenness of a substation is a proxy for how much power it is transmitting, and for
this reason we will use the alternative term load to denote it. Since it is the transmission
substations’ role to route power from generators to distribution substations, we focus our
attention to them. We determine the shortest paths starting from all generation substations
and ending on an all other reachable substations. For each transmission node we accumulate
the number of paths that pass through it; being at the start or at the end of a path does
not count. The highest possible load is 1633× 12466 ≃ 20 million. We find that substations
can have a load anywhere between 1 and 4 million, and determine the cumulative load dis-
tribution, i.e. the probability that a node’s load l is larger than a given value L (see Fig.
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FIG. 2: The probability that a substation has more than L transmission paths passing through
it. The continuous curve has the generalized power law form (2). Inset: histogram of the length
of the shortest alternative path r between the endpoints of an edge. In order to be able to include
edges with no alternative path, the abscissa is inverted.
2). The functional form of the cumulative load distribution is
P (l > L) ∼ (2500 + L)−0.7 (2)
Fig. 2 illustrates that 40% of the substations participate in tens or hundreds of paths only,
but 1% of them are part of a million or more paths. These high-load substations, although
possibly not hubs regarding their degree, play an important role in power transmission.
A fundamental requirement of the power grid is robustness, the ability to withstand and
tolerate errors (random failure) and targeted attacks[7, 8, 9]. To ensure the reliability of
power distribution, the transmission grid was conceived in such a way that there is more
than one electrical path between any two points in the system [13]. We wanted to verify
whether the actual topology of the current power grid has this feature of global redundancy,
or it has lost it during its growth and evolution. A possible measure of network redundancy
is the so-called edge range, defined as the distance between the two endpoints of an edge if
the edge connecting them were removed [14]. The inset of Fig. 2 shows the frequency of
different edge ranges r plotted as a function of r−1. We find that parallel edges and short
alternative paths are fairly frequent. However, around 15% of the edges in the power grid
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have an infinite range. In addition to the 2179 edges ending in distribution substations, close
to 900 edges connecting generators and/or transmission substations are radial. These radial
edges represent a clear vulnerability, as their loss disconnects their endpoints and creates
isolated clusters in the power grid.
While the connectedness of the power grid allows for the transmission of power over
large distances, it also implies that local disturbances propagate over the whole grid. The
failure of a power line due to lightning strike or short-circuit leads to the overloading of
parallel and nearby lines. Power lines are guarded by automatic devices that take them out
of service when the voltage on them is too high. Generating substations are designed to
switch off if their power cannot be transmitted; this protective measure has the unwanted
effect of diminishing power for all consumers. Another possible consequence of power line
failure is the incapacitation of transmission substations, possibly causing that the power
from generators cannot reach distribution substations and ultimately consumers.
In the unperturbed state each distribution substation can receive power from any of the
Ng = 1633 generators. As substations lose function, the number of generators connected
to (and able to feed) a certain distribution substation i, N ig, decreases. We introduce the
concept of connectivity loss to quantify the average decrease in the number of generators
connected to a distributing substation,
CL = 1−
〈
N ig
Ng
〉
i
, (3)
where the averaging is done over every distributing substation. In summary, the connectivity
loss measures the decrease of the ability of distribution substations to receive power from
the generators, and in the following we will express it as a percentage.
First we investigate the effect that the failure of a power-generating substation has on
consumers. Since initially the network contains a single connected component every con-
sumer can reach all generators, and their connectivity is 100%. As the number of generators
decreases this value will decrease due to both loss of the generators themselves and due to
loss of routing capabilities at the generating substation level. We remove nodes correspond-
ing to generators either randomly, or in the decreasing order of their degrees, and monitor
the connectivity loss as a function of the fraction of generators missing. The minimum pos-
sible loss is equal to the fraction fg of inactive generators and is due to the loss in generation
only (straight line on Fig. 3). We find that the connectivity loss caused by removing power
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FIG. 3: Connectivity loss in the power grid resulting from the failure of a fraction fg of generators.
The straight line represents the minimum loss due to the node removal itself. Circles: random
removal of generators; triangles: removal starting from the highest-degree generators. The curves
are averages of ten runs, where either the list of generators or the list of generators with the same
degree was randomly permuted.
substations remains very close to this minimum value (Fig. 3), even though generating sub-
stations tend to be the largest hubs in the system. The removal of generating substations
does not alter the overall connectivity of the grid thanks to a high level of redundancy at
the power generating substation level.
The situation can be dramatically different when the nodes that we remove are trans-
mission nodes. If the power grid were highly redundant the loss of a small number of
transmission substations should not cause power loss as power is rerouted through alter-
native paths. We find that even the removal of a single transmission node causes a slight
connectivity loss. We remove transmission nodes one by one, first randomly, then in the
decreasing order of their degree or load. For a random failure the connectivity loss is fairly
low and stays proportional with the number of nodes lost. The connectivity loss is signif-
icantly higher, however, when targeting high degree or high load transmission hubs (Fig.
4). The grid can withstand only a few failures of this nature before considerable parts of
the network become disconnected leading to substantial connectivity loss at consumer level.
For example, failure of only 4% of the nodes with high load may cause up to 60% loss of
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FIG. 4: Connectivity loss in the power grid due to the removal of nodes corresponding to trans-
mission substations. We remove a fraction ft of transmission nodes with four different algorithms:
randomly (circles), in the decreasing order of their degrees (triangles) or loads (diamonds), and
by recalculating the load every ten steps and removing the ten nodes with highest load (squares).
The curves corresponding to random and degree-based node removal were averaged over ten runs.
The load-based and cascading removal curves represent a single run.
connectivity. We also study an algorithm where we periodically recalculate the load of all
transmission nodes during node removal, and select the nodes with highest load to be deleted
next. This is a possible illustration of a propagating (cascading) power failure, where it is
more likely that substations that have the highest load in the perturbed configuration will
fail next. Fig. 4 illustrates that this cascading failure has the most damaging effect, as
the loss of only 2% of the high-load transmission substations leads to a connectivity loss
of almost 60%, and all distribution substations become virtually powerless at ft ≃ 8%. In
conclusion, the transmission hubs ensuring the connectivity of the power grid are also its
largest liability in case of power breakdowns.
This vulnerability of the electric power grid is inherent to its organization and there-
fore cannot be easily addressed without significant investment. Possible solutions include
increasing the redundancy and capacity of the existent structure or decreasing the reliance
on transmission by incorporating more generation at the distribution substation level. Such
distributed generation by small local plants can supplement power from the grid under nor-
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mal operation conditions and can greatly mitigate the effects of blackouts on the population.
Targeted use of generation located near the point of use might prove to be the only viable
economical alternative.
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